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November 2007 Archives

Citigroup's mark to market losses - announcement and conference call

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I don't hold Citigroup, but as one of the more troubled financials it is influencing the perception of the sector and stocks I do own, so I listened in on today's conference call, hoping to pick up some information on the progression of the sub-prime situation.

Gary Crittenden, CFO, provided the details on what is behind Citi's projected 8-11 billion mark to market loss for the current quarter. After the end of the third quarter, Moody's and S&P announced some downgrades of subprime; also, the ABX indices took a turn for the worse. Citi re-evaluated its sub-prime exposure and elected to make an announcement of what the mark to market losses will be at the end of the quarter, if the situation doesn' change. The company utilized a model, but incorporated assumptions about the large decrease of R/E values that are implied by the ABX index.

Based on this approach, losses are projected to be 8-11 billion, of which 5-8 billion will be on a total of 43 billion of ABS CDO exposure, a loss of 20%, more or less. Crittenden stressed that nothing has been impaired or downgraded and that Citi is being paid just fine right now. As such, the loss is strictly an accounting entry, and in point of fact the entry has not even been made yet. Further, Citi intends to continue to pay its dividend and expects that its capital will meet internal goals relatively soon. I felt that this announcement was intended to demonstrate to the market that Citgroup, even under a worst case scenario, is financially sound, putting to rest the swirling rumors and speculation. Hopefully, the market will be reassured when it is viewed in that light.

Many financial institutions have resisted the use of the ABX index for mark to market purposes, on the grounds it includes only 20 names, 100% sub-prime, and all of 2006 vintage. Comparing that with a CDO which has 25 to 50% of sub-prime, of varying vintages, and not necessarily any of the names in the ABX, is apples to oranges and not really very useful. I think Citi's approach makes some sense, but I fear it will legitimate the call for all companies to mark CDOs off the ABX. What is needed is a better index.

I am also concerned that the market will jump to the conclusion that all financial companies have further mark to market losses embedded in their balance sheets, equally severe, and discount the stocks accordingly. Also, for Citigroup to report losses of that size, even when as of this moment there has been no impairment and the payments are being made timely, based the premise that this one limited index in point of fact can predict the course of R/E prices, seems to have a tenuous connection with reality.

Other issues on the call were Charles Prince's resignation, not unexpected. Also, one analyst attempted to broach the topic of risk management, as an issue underlying the large losses. Management was unapologetic, nor did they mention any planned corrective action.

I think a failure to put Citigroup's announcement in perspective, specifically the fact that as of this moment the assets are not impaired, and also the fact the the ABX is not a really good source of economic projections, may create unwarranted fear in the marketplace. In reality, the announcement is reassuring in that it demonstrates Citigroup is strong even using a worst case scenario.

Buying Financial Guarantors

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Over the past two weeks, and trading very heavily today, I culled my portfolio of a number of stocks, using the proceeds to create large positions of approximately $175,000 each in Financial Guarantors MBIA (MBI) and Ambac (ABK). Both stocks are trading at multi-year lows and I have done a substantial amount of research which leaves me very enthusiastic about their long term potential. I will write a separate post on why I think these stocks are seriously undervalued.

I sold:

Wireless distributor Tesco (TESS) - I had a nice profit - poor earnings report with low margins
P&C Insuror Chubb (CB) - convenient source of funds, static situation
Homebuilders Pulte (PHM) & Centex (CTX) - not performing well
Proctor & Gamble (PG) - I had a nice profit - basically a defensive position
Office Depot (ODP) - poor pick - poor performance, use funds elsewhere

Financial Guarantors - misunderstood, unloved and undervalued

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MBIA (MBI) and Ambac (ABK) are monoline insurance companies that insure bonds against default, including those issued by governments and corporations, but also including Mortgage Backed Securities and CDOs, many of which are backed by sub-prime collateral. The stock of both companies has been severely punished over the past month, so that both are trading in the area of multi-year lows and well under Adjusted Book Value. Either of them could easily double from their current price.

The attraction here is that both have long histories of stable and profitable growth, increasing their book value approximately 10% (for MBI) to 15% (for ABK) annually over the past ten years. They underwrite to a remote loss standard, meaning that they issue their insurance in the expectation of paying minimal losses. In point of fact, the industry loss ratio is 12% of premium, on average. As a % of capital, losses run about 1% a year. As a % of net par outstanding (insurance in force) they run about .02%. Obviously insurance companies that don't pay a lot of losses are very profitable.

Both companies have insured substantial amounts of Securities backed in part by sub-prime mortgage collateral, and recently there has been a lot of speculation about the size of the final losses they will incur on this coverage. Based on the figures that have been bandied about, as well as the losses that appear to be built into the stock prices, the market does not understand how these transactions are structured and is seriously overestimating the loss potential. This creates an excellent investment opportunity for an investor who is willing to develop an understanding of the business and realistically weigh risk against reward. Basically, I do not expect either of these companies to incur losses from subprime that will prevent them from maintaining their Triple A financial ratings and continuing their profitable growth.

There is an abundance of factual material available, beyond the financial statements. S&P and Moody's have published analyses and statements, supporting the Financial Guarantors assertion that their capital positions are strong enough to maintain their Triple A status under extreme stress, and that such losses as do occur will be manageable. Both companies have disclosures available on their websites. ABK did a very informative conference today, which is available in replay. They have stress tested their book, working from the constituent loans up through the various layers, and with cumulative losses of 22.5% on 2006 and later vintage sub-prime, they would not incur meaningful losses. The 22.5% is a way out number - if loss severity was 50%, that would mean 45% of all sub-prime mortgages would go to foreclosure.

Basically, these companies pay claims on a mortgage backed security after the actual cumulative loss exceeds an attachment point, which could range from 15% to as high as 50% of the par amount. As of this moment, the cumulative loss on 2002 Vintage sub-prime mortgages stands at 5%. This vintage is seasoned and fairly stable. 2006 & 2007 are developing losses at a faster clip, and could very well wind up in the 10-15% range. From a common sense point of view, the maximum expected cumulative losses are under the lowest common attachment point of 15% and as such no losses would be payable. The situation is more complicated if the security insured is a CDO, which bundles other bonds. However, the general result is the same - the cumulative loss on the mortgage backed securities needs to exceed the attachment point, an extremely unlikely occurrence.

Both companies reported large mark to market losses on their Derivative Liabilities for the last quarter. They are providing insurance by means of Credit Default Swaps, and mark to market means they record these liabilities at what they (or their competitors) would charge in order to provide the same protection at today's higher prices. Both expect that these mark to markets will revert to zero as the underlying obligations mature. The mark to markets do not indicate the size of potential losses. This is actually very wonderful, as the price of the insurance goes up, it creates mark to market losses, which would justify higher premiums.

All companies in the industry have reported increased sales for the past quarter, with better premium levels. At this point in time, they are growing more rapidly than in the past, because the current uncertainty creates additional demand and pricing power.

These businesses generate a lot of cash: and, even if there were meaningful losses, they pay the losses on the same schedule that would have applied to the underlying collateral. That is, they pay interest when due and principal when due. As such, they could easily generate cash to pay the claims as this situation develops over a period of years.

I have made substantial investments in these two companies in my SLO portfolio. I think MBI can easily double from its current price, and ABK could triple. The question here would be one of timing. If and when the market develops an understanding of how these companies operate and what their loss exposure acutally is, the stocks should rise rapidly. Both are heavily shorted, and a serious short squeeze could develop. Eventually as the mark to markets revert to zero and as today's higher premiums are earned, these companies will be extremely profitable and will return to their former price levels.

Watching the Red and Green Numbers - making changes

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Watching the red and green numbers can be distracting and stressful, they flicker and pulse, occasionally the whole screen seems to go red or green or explodes in a sudden paroxysm of activity. What does it mean? Is there a trend? When will it change? Last week was volatile, and I was trading much more actively than usual, both in my personal portfolio and on SLO. Many of the stocks were the same, and my emphasis was on freeing up funds and reinvesting to focus resources on my high conviction picks.

As a bottom up investor I supposedly don't care about market direction, but in point of fact I maintain a distribution/confirmation indicator along the lines suggested by William O'Neil in "The Successful Investor." It's an Excel spreadsheet where I post the volume of the NYSE and Nasdaq, as well as the closing level of the DJIA, S&P, and Nasdaq indices. Based on this input, it flags and numbers distribution days, telling me the market has been going down, as if I would not have noticed.

On Friday 11/09, I spotted what I think is an anomaly - the market was down on high volume, yet the most volatile subset of the Financials - insurance companies that insure mortgages or bonds backed by mortgages - rallied strongly. This was based on ORI filing with the SEC that it had taken a large position in PMI. Both do mortgage insurance, not that profitable lately. That pumped PMI 30%, and other similar stocks were also up dramatically. My take on it was that it marked a possible bottom - this group of stocks is definitely a high stress point on the whole sub-prime/credit crunch crisis and they were rallying furiously while the market went down, led by the Tech stocks.

I hedge my personal portfolio with puts on the OEX index, and with the VIX running high, above 25, I was hoping to sell some of them at a low point as a means of reducing the cost of my hedge. Counterintuitive, reducing your insurance while the house is on fire. In any event, based on the possible bottom, on Friday I sold some of my puts. I vote with my mouse, so to speak. I had been looking for a deeper correction, but this could be it. Timing the market is not easy, but it's worth trying, because the rewards of being properly positioned at a turning point can seriously improve results. After all, you have an opinion, whether you examine it or not, so why not think carefully about it and then act on it?

I used to be a long distance runner, going to various road races on the weekends, running 5 or 6 miles. I never did that well, but I enjoyed getting together with my fellow runners, and I always ran my best for the whole race, well back in the pack, I would concentrate on passing whoever was ahead of me. I think of the SLO as being similar - I have a race to run, and I am still putting forth my best efforts and trying to move up in the standings. Going from 312 to 189 last week, I hope to gain more ground between now and the end of the contest.

Last week marked a change of direction on my SLO portfolio. I had been planning to let my positions run unchanged through the end of the contest, but as MBI and ABK (both Financial Guarantors and both high conviction picks) sank to what I regard as extreme buy points, I increased both positions to sizes somewhat above my normal risk limits. In the process I jettisoned Proctor and Gamble, a fine defensive stock. I am fully invested, seriously overweight Financials, P&C and Specialty Insurance companies, no banks.

Perhaps the Nasdaq/Tech outperformance is coming to an end, Financials could rally, sector rotation.

Maintaining High Conviction

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Over the past few weeks the market has been very volatile - my two largest positions - financial guarantors ABK and MBI - have been routinely oscillating as much as 10% a day, implied volatility on both is over 100, very high for stocks that normally would have a volatility of 25 or so. Obviously this type of market action can get you to where you start second guessing yourself, which raises my topic - the importance of having high conviction picks.

To develop high conviction, I am now setting minimum standards for myself, to review a reasonable amount of information and resolve any questions or reservations before I get involved with buying a stock. Beyond that, I look for an affirmative reason to buy, some special strength or business strategy that sets a company apart from others in its field. I should be making decisions such that they do not need to be revised unless new information becomes available.

Some benefits of doing my homework:

Not getting whipsawed. If I am uncertain as to the value of a stock, sudden or prolonged negative price movements may unnerve me, with the result that I will sell the stock just before it starts to go back up. A volatile market exacerbates this type of problem.

Enlarging a declining position decisively and with confidence. If I am clear on value, a price decrease is a welcome buying opportunity. Otherwise, it is an invitation to play double or nothing, perhaps compounding my losses like a losing gambler.

Winning trades executed at a good size level. I don't feel too bright when I take a flyer on something that looks good, controlling some perceived risk by keeping the position small, and then the stock immediately goes up 50%. Additional time spent on research will enable me to control my risk by understanding the company's operations and finances rather than spreading my money out on a bunch of mediocre ideas.

Longer holding periods - long term gains, less turnover, lower transaction costs. By clearly understanding the long term potential of a company I invest in, I will be less tempted to grab quick profits from small moves. I don't have anything against quick and easy profits, much better than round trips, but it is certainly disappointing to look at a stock's current price and realize I took the money and ran on something that has since tripled.

Maintaining high conviction means I need to look at new information on my picks as it becomes available and integrate that information with my opinion on the stock. What that has involved lately has been listening to a lot of presentations or conference calls relating to the Financial Guarantors and including the rating agencies, S&P, Moody's and Fitch.

I also spent quite a bit of time checking out various blogs on the two companies. Blogging seems to rely on taking dramatic positions: in this case, that MBI and ABK are in point of fact actually bankrupt, that their losses will exceed their capital, that the rating agencies will put them out of business by downgrading them, so on and so forth. In point of fact, I found very little useful information, mostly just a repetitious and derivative selection of doom and gloom predictions.

An emerging trend and very helpful is the the amount of disclosures the two companies have on their websites, as well as the easy access to reports from the rating agencies, all in one place. I spent quite a bit of time browsing all that information.

Where that leaves me on ABK and MBI is:

1) losses from subprime will be manageable within their current capital structure. The point is, that these companies have a robust cash flow for years into the future based on the profitability of the existing bond business, and losses, if any, from subprime are going to be paid as interest and princiapl fall due, and before that only when beneficial to the guarantors. The other point is, that the structure of CDOs or CDO squared provides a lot of protection in terms of the subordination or attachment point, which generally exceeds any reasonable estimation of cumulative losses.

2) the rating agencies are upgrading their models for stress testing capital adequacy and are likely to raise questions: some capital may need to be added. CIFG, a competitor, recently added 1.5 billion of capital from its parent company, in order to maintain their triple A rating. A difficult area in revising models is correlation, or the extent to which similar deals can expect to achieve similar performance. If you assume 15% cumulative losses, how do you spread it out over the individual bonds in these large and complexly structured portfolios? The answers make a difference. Fortunately correlation is a factual issue and eventually will be resolved accordingly.

3) financial guarantors have access to capital: from existing reinsurance treaties, also from the ability to obtain addional reinsurance on the 85% of their portfolios that is not sub-prime backed. Writing new business consumes captital, more for some classes than others. By slowing down new business or changing the mix, capital can be increased. Raising capital by hybrid bonds or convertible preferred, like Countrywide did, is another possibility. As a shareholder, I don't like the dilution involved in this sort of thing, and would hope it would be done as a last resort. Mamnagement are shareholders and will not give away the ship. Assuming ABK needed 1.5 billion and got very poor terms on a dilutive deal, the stock is still radically undervalued.

4) The whole issue of mark to market is subject to studious distortion and aggressive stupidity on the part of some critics. Credit insurance is primarily provided by Credit Default Swaps. Both ABK and MBI use forms that do not require them to post collateral and that provide for the payment of principal and interest when due (pay as you go.) A mark to market of the derivative liability so created consists of increasing it to what the insurer would currently charge for doing the protection over again. To assert that mark to market on these liabilities should conform to the mark to maket on assets similar to the underlying that Citigroup, for example, took is just plain ignorant, because ABK and MBI have no liquidity risk.

5) the prices on the ABX are not accurately pridicting cumulative losses on subprime. Mark to market based on assuming they are will eventually be reversed, so that many of the preannounced possible fourth quarter mark to market losses may not be as severe as suggested. The ABX for triple A rated subprime has been predicting about 50% cumulative losses on the underlying, more than three times the highest reasonable projection. Eventually people will notice that the sky is not falling.

6) Insider buys on ABK have been impressive in size, two buys 10,000 shares at 25 each, more or less, a quarter million is not chump change or symbolic to any private investor. I have done well in the past buying at prices similar to those paid by management on large insider buys, as I have done here.

Taking all of this togehter, I am not deterred by my unrealized losses on ABK and MBI. From a time point of view, I can't predict whether they will return to normal values before the end of the SLO contest. They are extremely sensitive to any kind of news either way, and it may require years before their recovery is complete. If it takes three years, my annualized returns will be around 40%, not too shabby.

What Dad taught me about investing

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Dad did very well in the stock market, and spent quite a bit of time over the years coaching me on the subject. He was successful in business, serving for many years as Director of Research at a large publicly traded company. Intelligent, quiet and reserved but strong-minded and decisive, he played a good game of bridge, enjoyed much fine wine, and had a long-standing interest in the market. My daughter and I were talking about his investment ideas yesterday, and I thought some of you might enjoy what I can remember of his thinking.

His philosophy focused on buying and holding a few very strong stocks, large well run businesses that could grow 20% (well, almost, you can't always do that) per year - indefinitely. He had a publication with a page for each stock, featuring a graph of their results, and for him the only chart pattern to look for was a long ascending line - revenue, earnings and stock price going up year after year. That was Investing 101, learning to recognize the pattern. He had a pretty clear idea of what companies he liked and bought them when prices were not excessive.

What this boiled down to, investing from the 1950's until the late 1990's, was big pharmaceuticals. He stayed invested almost exclusively in equities even in old age, holding at most 7 or 8 stocks, and defended his sector concentration on the grounds that we have a drug culture, we want to take pills to fix things, the older we get, the more drugs we need, the whole argument from demographics. That was getting in front of long term trends.

When I was 14 or 15, I can remember him telling me about an investment in Marathon Oil. As I recall it, they were building a pipeline somewhere in the Middle East, when this was completed, they were going to have a cost advantage which would eventually result in a good size increase in the price of the stock. There was obviously some geo-political risk involved but he concluded it was manageable and took a large position, winding up with a doubler. It was about doing your homework, weighing the risk vs. the reward, and going in heavy on your best ideas.

Dad would not own any stock that was not listed on the NYSE. He told a story of having invested in a small stock, listed on the Amex, doing his homework and coming up with a clear winner. When he sold it, the price went down just long enough to make a sizable dent in his profit. Presumably whoever made a market in the stock took advantage of the thin trading to ding him on his way out. That was about only playing where you can get a level field.

Another story was about how he was sitting on the back porch, drinking a beer, and decided that because he liked the beer the stock would be a good buy. Regretfully management was in the process of looting the company and his investment became worthless. Any dishonesty or impropriety on the part of management was a clear sell signal, time to promptly unload the entire holding at whatever the current price was. He had actual possession of his stocks, and kept them in a safe at his bank. He adopted this practice after spending several weeks on the phone recovering them from a broker who later went bankrupt.

He stuck with his winners. It was a natural process in growing as an investor, to start with many smaller investments and gradually cull out the losers, ending with a concentrated portfolio containing profitable long-term holdings in consistent performers. One of his most successful long term investments was his wines - he bought the best vintages as they came out and stored them in the cellar, getting very good appreciation over the years as the wine matured. As a scientist, he didn't wax too poetical, but I'm sure he grasped the connection - good investing is like laying down a fine wine, a matter of foresight and patience, planning ahead.

Having worked all his life in R&D, he appreciated its importance in driving growth and profit. He had done some work to develop a thesis which related a company's growth to its R&D budget. As I recall it, he was able to demonstrate that companies that spent at least 7% of their revenues on R&D grew faster than those who spent less. This appreciation of inventiveness was not limited to glamorous new products, but also extended to design and process improvements, the power of efficient systems and accumulated tradecraft, even in boring businesses. There was nothing wrong with a boring business: if it was well run and continued to increase earnings, that was excitement enough.

He monitored his portfolio by means of a small ledger book, making a weekly note of closing prices. I never saw an annual statement in the house: if he read them at all he didn't keep them. He read the WSJ daily, taking his time, and picked up what he needed that way, making mental notes. He didn't pay much attention to his broker, and relied on his own judgment when selecting stocks. He was uncomfortable giving others specific advise on investing, the only time he ever did it was for an elderly aunt. In 1985, or thereabouts, he suggested to her that she put her remaining funds in long term bonds, then yielding extremely high interest rates. Of course, when interest rates declined, her bonds increased in value and she was very pleased. Aside from a case like that, stocks were the best investment.

Trading on margin didn't work. "You can't make money fast enough to pay the interest." He always kept some of his portfolio in cash and didn't worry too much about the return on it, "Just keep it safe at small interest." The point was to have it available when needed.

In the fifties and early sixties he accumulated an art collection, consisting of bronze sculptures of bulls. Some of them were very old, Egyptian and Chinese, but most of them were more recent, some of them by sculptors whose name would seem to ring a bell. He had one of a bull fighting a wolf, but nothing like the bull fighting the bear. Aside from that, he took no interest in art, and I think it was more an expression of his basic outlook - he was bullish: over the long haul he was optimistic about business, the economy, and this country, no small feat for someone raised during the Depression.

Things have changed a lot since his day, the internet and the amount of information available, the speed of communication, the amazing variety of investment options, the profusion of derivatives, etc. In many ways I think it's safer and easier, there is more of a level field out there for the small investor, spreads are narrower, commissions are lower, regulation is stronger, and information is only a mouse click away. But I think a lot of what he told me still applies, sticking with the basics.

Tom