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November 2008 Archives

Ambac earns downgrade from Moody's

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Ambac (ABK) reported a third quarter loss of 8.45 per share, resulting in negative shareholder equity. Book value per share fell to (3.09). The primary cause was impairments of 2.5 billion on the company's insured book of high grade CDOs. Moody's response was swift and pridictable: a multi-notch downgrade to Baa1. Still investment grade, Moody's notes, in that their aggregate resources exceed their exected losses.

Ambac has immediate liquidity problems as a result of the downgrade - they will be required to post collateral or terminate deals in their asset management business. In reporting earnings, the company disclosed they are several billion short of what will be needed. To bridge the gap, they will need permission from the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner, Sean Delwig, to make intercompany transactions. The issue has been under discussion but had not been resolved as of the earnings conference call this morning.

Ambac shares were running up before earnings, on rumors and speculation that Treasury would include the company in the TARP program. As the economic outlook darkened, I had been progressively more uneasy about Ambac's CDOs and reduced my Marketocracy position substantially.

In my personal portfolio, I had taken enough profits to lock in a breakeven on the whole misadventure. I have been playing the stock by use of options, Jan10 2.50 calls, under the theory that I could control more shares with less capital at risk in case the stock goes to zero. The bid/ask on the calls is usually fairly wide, and as I was trying to sell them yesterday it was hard to get filled, even at the bid. As a way around the problem, I sold enough shares short to offset most of the calls - made the position almost "delta neutral" in the parlance of the trade.

After the downgrade, Ambac shares are trading at 1.69, down 50%, in the after hours market, with fairly heavy volume. That leaves me with the question, do I close one half of the position and play the stock to go up or down, or do I just take my ball and go home? It has been a wonderful learning experience, swinging from a large loss to a large gain to a stalemate: maybe I should just look at it as a tuition refund and go on to something more constructive.

With the market down as far as it is, and with volatility still high, my preference is to play beaten down stocks, looking for the proverbial four bagger. There are a lot of them out there - no need to continue with Ambac when there are so many qualtiy stocks trading at prices that leave ample room for profit in the event of a recovery.

I have been using nonGAAP adjusted book value as my valuation metric - it is GAAP book value plus the present value of future installments. That now stands at 7.18 per share, and if you think mark to market losses will revert to zero over time, you could add them back and come up with an "adjusted analytical book value" of about 19. With the shares trading at 1.69, there is still quite a bit of attraction as a speculative value play, either by means of a bailout or by realizing the intrinsic values with the company in run-off.

Treasury could get involved by buying assets from Ambac's asset management business, by providing reinsurance which would increase rating agency capital, or by taking an equity position. If Treasury were to take an equity position, the question would be whether they would treat Ambac as kindly as Goldman Sachs, for instance, or whether Ambac would be treated like AIG, with 80% dilution to shareholders.

Ambac CEO David Wallis is pushing for the reinsurance solution - with good reason, it avoids diluting shareholders. He argues that Ambac meets the two basic criteria for assistance - systemic importance and solvency. My suggestion would be, call the main players in for a conference, make them accept a 5 billion infusion of capital by preferred stock, with warrants at the 20 day trailing average share price, and in the amount of 15% of the preferred capital. That would mean MBIA (MBI) and Ambac, as the two largest monolines, would be bailed out with sufficient captial to make the ratings unimpeachable.

I would gladly accept the dilution in favor of the immediate boost to share value and the improved rating stability, presumably at the triple A level. I don't have a clue whether any intervention by Treasury is possible or likely. As of this moment, I will look for the share price to get down under 1.00, at which point I will close the short position and take my chances with the calls.

P.S. after this was written, Ambac published a response to Moody's downgrade, which included this statement: "Based on Ambac's most recent analysis, the liquidity gap between the market value of the investment securities held in the financial services businesses and the value of the financial services liabilities that may need to be collateralized or terminated at the Baa1 rating is approximately $3.2 billion. Almost all of the transactions entered into by our financial services businesses are guaranteed by AAC. Ambac has received approval from the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI) to utilize the resources of AAC to resolve this liquidity gap." I take this to mean that there will not be a fire sale or an AIG style intervention.

CitiGroup - they ought to change the rules on buybacks

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As I watched CitiGroup (C) swing in the wind yesterday, yet another financial shorted down to a fraction of its book value, with the usual discussions - the market knows something, no-one will do business with them, rumors about the assets - I came with an idea which I think would solve this type of problem.

The problem is, when a company is under short-selling attack, their hands are tied as far as defending themselves. There are definite rules, aimed at preventing companies from manipulating their share prices, which limit the amount and price of buybacks a company can do. To be protected against allegations of manipulation, they can't trade more than a certain percentage of the day's volume, I think its 25%, and they can't buy above the last trade.

CitiGroup at 3.77 is now trading at a fraction of tangible book value per share, which is about 9. GAAP Book value is around 18. As pundits pointed out yesterday, the company's market cap at 20 billion was less than their TARP infusion of 25 billion. We know they have the funds, why not buy back as many shares as possible? Some would complain on behalf of taxpayers, that the use of TARP funds was inappropriate. But I would answer, Tresaury holds warrants - if the value of shares is increased, the value of the warrants is increased.

My suggestion: when a company's shares trade below book value, it enhances shareholder value to buy back the shares. So, once the stock gets below book, management should be given carte blanche to buy as much stock as cash resources permit. Current legislation should be changed to provide a Safe Harbor exception of this type.

MBIA (MBI), whose shares closed Friday at 4.24, which is .36 of book, would be a case in point. The company has approximately 293 million left on its buyback authorization: at Friday's close they could buy back 69 million shares, approximately 25% of the total 273 million that have been issued. That would increase management's best estimate of the total economic value of each share from 37.55 to approximately 50.00, well worth doing.

If management's hands were not tied by law, they could make a quick end of the problem of aggressive short-selling, by buying up the entire short interest. In MBIA's case, there are quite a few large holders such as Warburg Pincus and Third Avenue, leaving a limited amount of shares available for short-sellers to cover with. A wonderful short squeeze, like the one on VW, could be created.

Hartford Insurance Group (HIG) would be another case where the legal permission to conduct aggressive buybacks would be appropriate. Even Allstate (ALL) is trading at half its book value.

Again, the rule would be, once shares trade under book value, the company can do buybacks freely and unannounced, as many shares as the market offers for sale on a given day.

This type of short-selling is basically a down in the gutter brawl: the problem is, management is playing by Marquis of Queensbury rules while their adversaries are kicking them below the belt and gouging their eyes out. Why not change the rules so company management can defend the interests of shareholders? We could give company management access to the same financial weapons of mass desturction used by the short-sellers.

Many expect that by Monday CitiGroup will have been disposed of by another of these week-end marathons, with the shareholders wiped out. It would be better to let the company defend itself than to ratify the damage done by short-sellers and rumormongers in a fear-crazed market.

As a matter of fact, I think it would be legally correct for a company to assert the self-evident fact that they are creating share value as a defense against any and all charges of manipulation in a case of this type. A company like CItiGroup, when under attack, should simply buy as many shares as possible. If taken to court, the defense is simple: it is self-evident that management was acting in the interests of shareholders - the shares were trading at less than the value of the assets. Res ipsa loquitur.